The past week has served up another stress test for our constitutional framework as the Constitutional Court found against parliament, ruling its vote on the Phala Phala panel report invalid.
This is the second time in nine years that parliament has been found to have acted in an unconstitutional manner by the apex court. The first time was when it failed to hold president Jacob Zuma accountable over the Nkandla saga in 2017.
The issue goes beyond individual presidents or scandals. It is about deeper structural flaws in the way South Africa’s constitutional democracy has evolved. Parliament, as the institution entrusted with holding the executive accountable, has repeatedly failed to do so. The result is that party loyalty frequently supersedes institutional responsibility.
That should concern every South African.
Much of the debate has focused on personalities and political outcomes. But the real crisis lies in the accountability framework itself. Our constitutional system contains a contradiction that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. The president is elected by parliament, yet parliament is often politically incapable of exercising independent oversight over the person it elected.
This is partly the consequence of an institutional design inherited from the Westminster tradition but implemented only halfway.
In Westminster systems, conventions matter as much as formal rules. Offices such as the speaker are expected to operate above party politics. South Africa adopted aspects of this system, but without sufficiently insulating key constitutional offices from party-political control.
Strengthening parliament’s independence and reforming executive accountability can no longer be postponed
One such office is that of the speaker of the National Assembly. In theory, the speaker is supposed to protect the integrity of parliament and ensure that accountability mechanisms function fairly and independently. In practice, however, the speaker remains deeply embedded within party structures and political hierarchies.
Within the governing party’s own internal structures, the speaker may rank below the president, while constitutionally being expected to oversee processes that hold the president accountable. The result is that party loyalty frequently supersedes institutional responsibility.
South Africans have watched this contradiction play out repeatedly.
Under the Zuma administration, parliament failed in its constitutional obligations during the Nkandla saga, leading to the ConCourt’s landmark judgment against both Zuma and the National Assembly. At the time, many argued that the failure was unique to the excesses of the Zuma era. History has now repeated itself under President Cyril Ramaphosa.
That matters because it demonstrates that the problem is systemic. Some changes need to be pursued urgently. The office of the speaker requires urgent reform. A rule requiring a speaker to resign from party leadership structures upon assuming office would be a solution.
Similarly, serious consideration should be given to reforming the relationship between the Presidency and parliament itself. We should also be willing to ask a more fundamental constitutional question of whether South Africans should directly elect the president.
At present, the president is elected by parliament, which means accountability is often mediated through party structures. A directly elected president would create a far stronger relationship between the office of the president and the citizens themselves, rather than between the president and internal party machinery.
When parliament fails to do its job, political disputes inevitably migrate to the courts. Judges then become the final referees in matters that should have been resolved through democratic oversight and parliamentary processes.
Globally it is common cause that if one desires the highest office, one seeks a mandate from citizens. Would the conduct of our presidents have been different had they feared the judgment of voters more than that of party caucuses? Presidents who know political survival depends directly on public confidence behaves differently from those who know party structures can absorb, delay and ultimately defend them.
Across the African continent, we are witnessing democratic frustration increasingly giving rise to instability, unrest and, in some cases, military coups. No democracy is immune when citizens begin to believe that institutions no longer produce accountability or meaningful change.
That is why institutional reform matters so urgently. These are not radical proposals. They are reforms aimed at strengthening democratic legitimacy and protecting constitutional governance in the long term.
Because when parliament fails to do its job, political disputes inevitably migrate to the courts. Judges then become the final referees in matters that should have been resolved through democratic oversight and parliamentary processes.
South Africa is already seeing the consequences of this trend. Increasingly, fundamental political disputes are settled not through parliament, but through litigation. When every major political controversy ends up before judges, it reflects a breakdown elsewhere in the democratic system.
Without structural change, South Africa will continue cycling through the same crises: another president, another scandal, another parliamentary failure, another ConCourt judgment.
If South Africa is serious about defending constitutional democracy, then strengthening parliament’s independence and reforming executive accountability can no longer be postponed.
The ConCourt has now delivered the same message twice and will likely deliver it again. The real question is whether parliament is finally prepared to listen.
• Maimane is leader of Build One South Africa
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