The R320m upgrade of the Rooiwal wastewater treatment plant was doomed from the start, wrecked by infighting, financial misconduct, chronic underperformance and the diversion of funds, as the project lurched from one crisis to the next before crashing spectacularly.
The details of how the project — which was supposed to ensure the supply of clean water to communities in Hammanskraal — eventually collapsed in July 2022 are laid bare in court papers filed by controversial tenderpreneur Edwin Sodi.
Sodi, who filed his papers in the Pretoria high court in March, wants the court to reverse a May 2025 judgment that declared the ill‑fated tender null and void.
The judgment, stemming from a self‑review application in which the Tshwane municipality persuaded the court to set aside its own decision to award the tender to a joint venture involving Sodi’s Blackhead Consulting, also ordered that all joint venture partners repay the metro the profits they derived from the Rooiwal contract.
Sodi’s attack on the judgment is twofold. He argues that the ruling was granted erroneously because Tshwane failed to properly serve Blackhead Consulting and, therefore, the company was unaware of the self-review application. He also contends that Tshwane did not disclose to the courts that Blackhead withdrew from the joint venture early in the contract and, as such, the finding that the company should repay profits is irrational.
But beyond Sodi’s legal attempt to extricate himself from the Rooiwal mess, the court papers expose the chaotic workings of the joint venture between Blackhead, now known as the Andani Engineering Group, CMS Water Engineering and NJR Projects, another company of which Sodi was previously a director.

A report compiled by Motsoeneng Bill Attorneys (MBA) on behalf of the Tshwane metro recommends the blacklisting of the three entities for their failure to complete the project. It paints a picture of a project that descended into chaos as internal disputes, financial misconduct and poor performance crippled the joint venture from within, just as the refurbishment of the plant was getting off the ground.
“The chronology of events is both extensive and revealing,” the report states. “It charts a trajectory from initial contractual formation through progressive dysfunction, culminating in abandonment, disputes, diversion of funds and eventual termination.”
When the site was handed over to the joint venture in March 2020, it was expected to complete the project in two years. However, by January 2022 it had made little progress and failed to resume construction following the holiday season shutdown because of internal disputes over cash flows, payment of labourers and funding of suppliers.
Between January and March, Tshwane’s officials intervened, requesting recovery plans, none of which were forthcoming. Instead, internal conflict escalated, the report says.
Things came to a head at the end of March when the joint venture diverted funds meant for critical infrastructure to pay labourers.
According to the report: “On March 31 2022, the joint venture received payment of R4.3m from the city. This payment was expressly made for the singular and defined purpose of securing the release of belt press equipment that was, at the time, being lawfully retained by the clearing agent, VDM, pending settlement of outstanding charges.”
The city has been placed in a position of heightened risk, compelled to adopt extraordinary measures and exposed to consequences that extend well beyond the confines of the original contract
— Report by Motsoeneng Bill Attorneys
Instead of paying the entire R4.3m to VDM, CMS diverted R1.2m to settle payments owed to workers, prompting VDM to refuse to release the belt presses, which were needed urgently to facilitate the upgrade.
In May CMS and NJR Projects started squabbling over the R1.2m, with the former accusing the latter of fraud and misrepresentation. At the same time, Tshwane officials tried to get the joint venture to cede the contract to other companies, the report states. When that failed, the metro terminated the contract at the end of July.
Of the failure to secure the belt presses, the MBA report says: “Despite the city having paid approximately R16.2m for belt presses and a further R3.7m in demurrage and customs VAT, the equipment remained undelivered. The failure resulted directly from the joint ventures’s internal misconduct and cannot be ascribed to external factors. The failure has caused severe financial loss and compromised the city’s operational capacity.”
Taken cumulatively, the report states, the joint venture’s actions demonstrate that the prejudice suffered by the Tshwane metro is not merely incidental or financial in nature, but systemic and far-reaching.
“The city has been placed in a position of heightened risk, compelled to adopt extraordinary measures and exposed to consequences that extend well beyond the confines of the original contract,” the report says.
Despite the damning findings, Sodi argues in his court filing that Blackhead should not be held accountable for the project’s collapse, nor should the courts have ordered it to pay back any profits because the company withdrew from the project at an early stage.
“[T]he court would not have granted a disgorgement of profits in circumstances where the applicant had not made a profit, having withdrawn from the joint venture at the beginning. Put differently, the first respondent should not have sought relief against the applicant in the circumstances,” Sodi says in the application.
He also insists that the judgment setting aside the Rooiwal contract was erroneously granted because Blackhead was never properly served. He claims notices were sent to the wrong e-mail address, documents were left in the care of someone who did not have the authority to receive them, and that critical court records were not served at all.
In an interview with the Sunday Times, [Tshwane city manager Johann] Mettler said he had initiated disciplinary hearings against 13 officials in connection with the failed upgrade of the Rooiwal plant
However, Tshwane city manager Johann Mettler dismissed Sodi’s arguments. In his answering affidavit, he says Blackhead’s rescission application had no prospect of success because it was filed far too late — eight months after the company became aware of the self-review judgment.
Mettler also insists that Blackhead could not escape liability by claiming it later withdrew from the joint venture. The contract was awarded to all three partners, including Blackhead, he says in his affidavit.
Further, he says service was properly effected at Blackhead’s chosen address, dismissing the company’s claim that it did not receive the papers as legally irrelevant. Blackhead had no defence, he says, adding that even if the judgement were rescinded and the matter reopened, the court would likely still conclude that the tender was unlawful.
While Sodi and the city face off in court, the metro is also pursuing accountability for the project’s collapse. In an interview with the Sunday Times, Mettler said he had initiated disciplinary hearings against 13 officials in connection with the failed upgrade of the Rooiwal plant.
He said the hearings flowed from referrals made by the Special Investigating Unit (SIU). In 2020 President Cyril Ramaphosa authorised the SIU to investigate allegations of corruption and mismanagement around the project. Mettler said the SIU’s preliminary findings revealed widespread corruption in the administration and management of the project.
Mettler, who said he expected many more disciplinary referrals from the SIU, dismissed suggestions by some opposition parties in the Tshwane council that he should reinstate five senior officials he suspended in connection with the project in April 2024.
He said that while concerns about the amount of money the city had spent on the suspended officials were valid, “these people have been charged with serious misconduct and my relationship with them has broken down completely. Reinstating them into different positions would amount to asking the wolf to guard the hen house.”












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